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The Use of Community Standards by the Child
Online Protection Act to Determine if Material is
Harmful to Minors is not Unconstitutional: Ashcroft
v. American Civil Liberties Union
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - THE MILLER TEST -
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Child
Online Protection Act's use of "community standards" to deter-
mine if material is "harmful to minors" does not violate the First
Amendment.
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union et al., 122 S. Ct. 1700
(2002)
The Internet' is a vast resource where users can easily access
educational materials and international news or follow sporting
events.2 There are also numerous sexually-oriented web sites that
are accessible to a person of any age with minimal effort.3 The
Communication Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) was enacted by Con-
gress to attempt to protect children by making illegal the "know-
ing transmission over the Internet of obscene or indecent mes-
sages to any recipient less than 18 years of age."' The United
1. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The web, or Internet,
began in 1969 as a military program called "ARAPNET" (Advanced Research Project
Agency) which allowed military, defense contractors, and universities to communicate,
despite network damage. Id. at 849-850. ARAPNET was an example of networks of com-
puters communicating with each other and was copied by many civilian networks. Id. at
850. ARAPNET is no longer in use but the Internet concept was extremely successful and
now allows for international communication that is predominately based in the U.S. Id.
2. Ashcroft v. Civil Liberties Union, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002). The web can be used to
read newspapers, purchase items, or follow sports. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1703.
3. Id. at 1703-04. Access to the Internet is widely available throughout the country
with approximately 176.5 million Americans having Internet access. Id. at 1703. Because
of the ease of the Internet a child with very little computer ability can purposely or acciden-
tally find explicit hardcore pornography. Id.
4. Id. at 1704. In addition The Communications Decency Act made the following
illegal
d) Sending or displaying offensive material to persons under 18. Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in
449
450 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
States Supreme Court decided in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union5 that CDA was in opposition to the First Amendment be-
cause of its restrictions.'
In response to the decision, Congress passed the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA) which narrowed the scope of CDA signifi-
cantly by restricting charges to those who make the communica-
tion for "commercial purposes".7 In addition, COPA does not apply
to e-mail messages, but only to matter actually displayed on the
web and it only stops "material that is harmful to minors", rather
than the CDA's much broader "patently offensive" communica-
tions.8 COPA looked to the three-prong test for obscenity that the
Supreme Court defined in Miller v. California9 and developed
three standards to determine "material that is harmful to mi-
nors."'0 COPA carries both civil and criminal penalties and fines."
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contempo-
rary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity.
47 U.S.C. §223 (1997).
5. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870-71.
6. Id.
7. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1704-05. COPA prohibits any person from "knowingly and
with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by
means of the World Wide Web, making any communication for commercial purposes that is
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors." 47 U.S.C.
§231(a)(1) (1997). The Act provides that a communication will be considered commercial
only if the person "is engaged in the business of making such communications." Id. Accord-
ing to COPA, one engaged in the business refers to a person:
who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the
World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time,
attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of such person's trade or
business, with the objective of earning a profit as a result of such activities (although
it is not necessary that the person make a profit or that the making or offering to
make such communications be the person's sole or principal business or source of in-
come).
47 U.S.C. §.231(e)(2)(b) (1997).
8. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1705.
9. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
10. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1705. COPA defines material that is harmful to minors as:
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or
other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find,
taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to,
or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent
female breast; and
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A person can avoid the penalties imposed by COPA by restricting
access of their website containing material "harmful to minors" by
requiring a credit card, personal identification number, adult code,
a digital certificate guaranteeing age, or any other possible options
that are available and technologically probable.12
Before COPA took effect, a group of the respondents brought a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania testing COPA's constitutionality, alleging
that it was not in accordance with the First and Fifth Amend-
ments and asked for an injunction to prevent its enforcement. 13
The group filing the suit consisted of several different and varying
organizations that make income from their websites by selling
advertising space, selling products or charging for displaying
other's material. 4 The groups have varying content on their web-
sites that they believe is sexually oriented and could be attacked
by COPA because the material, although valuable for adults, could
be construed as "harmful to minors".5 The district court decided
to grant the injunction stopping the enforcement of COPA because
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.
47 U.S.C.§ 231(e)(6) (1997).
11. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1705. Violations of COPA can incur a civil penalty of up to
$50,000 for each violation of the Act and criminal fines of up to $50,000 and/or up to six
months in prison with an additional $50,000 fine if the Act is violated intentionally. 47
U.S.C. §231(a) (1997).
12. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1705. According to 47 U.S.C. §231
an individual may qualify for a defense if he: in good faith, has restricted access by
minors to material that is harmful to minors-- (A) by requiring the use of a credit
card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number; (B) by
accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or (C) by any other reasonable meas-
ures that are feasible under available technology.
47 U.S.C.§ 231(c)(1) 1997.
13. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1705-06.
14. Id. at 1706. Filers are the American Civil Liberties Union, Androgony Books, Inc.,
d/b/a A Different Light Bookstores, the American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expres-
sion, Artnet Worldwide Corporation, BlackStripe, Addazi Inc. d/b/a Condomania, the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Free Speech Media,
OBGYN.net, Philadelphia Gay News, PlanetOut Corporation, Powell's Bookstore, Riotgrrl,
Salon Internet, Inc., and West Stock, Inc., now known as ImageState North America, Inc.
Id.
15. Id. In the lower court decision the opinion describe the respondents as follows:
The plaintiffs represent a broad range of individuals, entities, and organizations su-
ing on behalf of their members, who are speakers, content providers, and ordinary
users on the Web. Some of the plaintiffs post, read, and respond to content including,
inter alia, resources on obstetrics, gynecology, and sexual health; visual art and po-
etry; resources designed for gays and lesbians; information about books and stock
photographic images offered for sale; and online magazines.
Id. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (1999).
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the respondents had shown a substantial likelihood that COPA
would encumber free speech and that the respondents would
probably establish at trial that it was invalid. 6
The Attorney General appealed the decision and the court of
appeals affirmed on a different basis than the parties and the dis-
trict court cited. 7 The court of appeals focused on COPA's reliance
on the use of "community standards" to determine if material is
not suitable for minors and subject to COPA's penalties.18 The
court concluded that because of the nature of the web and the in-
ability to restrict materials geographically there is undue burden
placed on Web publishers because it forces them to conform to the
standards set by the strictest and least tolerant communities.' 9 By
using the least tolerant standard the court feared that "vast
amounts of material" would be screened and, therefore, there was
a high probability that COPA would be unconstitutional.2" The
Attorney General, John Ashcroft, petitioned The Supreme Court of
the United States for certiorari and the Court granted it to exam-
ine the court of appeals' decision that COPA is unconstitutional
because of its reliance on "community standards" and, therefore,
in violation of the First Amendment.2' The Supreme Court va-
cated the court of appeals' decision.22
The Court examined free speech and the first amendment, not-
ing that obscene speech has always been outside the protection of
the First Amendment.23 The Court decided in Miller what consti-
tutes obscene, and therefore unprotected, speech by using "com-
munity standards".24 The majority developed Miller to avoid using
16. American Civil Liberties Union, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493. The court believed that
COPA was not the least restrictive way to protect minors and keep them from accessing
materials on the web. Id. at 497.
17. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (2000).
18. Id. at 174. The court wrote: "We base our particular determination of COPA's likely
unconstitutionality, however, on COPA's reliance on 'contemporary community standards'
in the context of the electronic medium of the Web to identify material that is harmful to
minors." Id.
19. Id. at 166.
20. Id. at 174.
21. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1707.
22. Id.
23. Id. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 376 (1957) (Supreme Court decided that
obscene material is not constitutionally protected speech or press).
24. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1707. The court developed a three-prong test:
(a)Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
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a "sensitive person" standard, and to establish an average person
criteria so as not to be constitutionally restrictive. The Miller test
prevents speech from being judged by an individual opinion or
group of opinions. 25  The court conceded that despite this, juries
throughout the country will inevitably be swayed by their geo-
graphic location and local standards.2 6 Because COPA has not yet
been enforced, the court did not speculate as to what different jury
instructions would be needed, but did note that community stan-
27dards do not need to be determined by an actual geographic area.
Because of this, the court of appeals was afraid that all web pub-
lishers would be forced to apply the least tolerant communities'
standard.28
The majority looked again at the CDA and remarked that COPA
covered significantly less material and had two important restric-
tions that the CDA did not that narrowed its scope.29 COPA de-
fined "particular sexual acts or parts", as those having a prurient
interest and that have no educational value for minors." Justice
Thomas explained that the serious value concept is especially sig-
nificant because "serious value" would not differ between commu-
nities, but would be decided on whether a reasonable person
would find value in the material. As a result courts can impress
some limitations on the term.2 ' For the prurient interest prong to
be met there must be something erotic about the material.32
In Hamling v. United States33 the Supreme Court explored the
same issues and decided that if a statute is narrowed adequately
by requiring both a prurient interest and a lack of serious value it
is not unconstitutional to apply community standards when a pub-
lisher is distributing information to a national audience with dif-
fering community standards.34 In Sable Communications of Cali-
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
25. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1708.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1709.
29. Id. at 1709-10.
30. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1710.
31. Id. The court explained: "This is because 'the value of [a] work [does not] vary from
community to community based on the degree of local acceptance it has won."' Reno, 117 S.
Ct. at 2345. The limitation on the definition allows for a standardization of the require-
ment of serious value. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1710.
32. Asheroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1710.
33. 418 U.S. 87 (1979).
34. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1710. Hamling involved the mailing of brochures with sexu-
ally explicit photographs and the court found that jurors could use their knowledge of what
the average person in the community would think and that a national standard was not
Winter 2003
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fornia, Inc. v. FCC35, fifteen years after Hamling, the court once
again decided that the use of community standards was permissi-
ble.36 The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' contention
that the present case was distinguished from Sable and Hamling
because Web publishers cannot control the geographical dissemi-
nation of their material.37 Justice Thomas explained that the con-
trol of the distribution of materials was not important to the deci-
sions in either case and the Court decided that the responsibility
remains with the sender to comply with the standards and did not
consider if this was feasible.38
The majority rejects assigning the Internet a different approach
to determining what constitutes unsuitable material because the
medium varies so greatly from mail and telephone communica-
tions.39 Justice Thomas wrote that it is the publishers' responsibil-
ity to obey a particular community's standards if the publisher
chooses to send material to that community.4 ° A publisher must
use a medium that allows him to reach only a certain community
if he wants to be judged by that community's standards only.41
The Court emphasizes that material that is deemed "harmful to
minors" is not completely removed from the web; it is merely
placed behind a screen that requires adult identification to view
it.42 The Court found no other grounds to distinguish the present
case from Hamling and Sable and noted that if it were to find
COPA to be unconstitutional because of the use of community
standards it would be in opposition to previous findings of the
Court and make federal obscenity statutes unconstitutional.43
Justice Thomas rejected the respondents' argument that COPA
is unconstitutional because it is overbroad, because the respon-
dents have not yet proven that COPA's reliance on community
standards alone makes it violate the First Amendment." The
over-breadth must also be substantial, which it is not in regards to
necessary. They did not have to suit their messages to the most restrictive community.
Hamling, 418 U.S. 87 (1979).
35. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). Sable involved prerecorded sexually explicit phone messages.
36. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1711.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1712.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1712.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1712-13.
44. Id. at 1713.
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COPA.4 ' The majority believes that the respondents, and Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, offer only speculation and did not meet the
burden necessary for the court to affirm the court of appeals' deci-
sion."' The decision made in this case is restricted only to COPA's
reliance on community standards and does not consider any other
questions raised by this case.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agrees and points
out the respondents' lack of any examples of material that does
not contain the serious value necessary, and would still result in
differences in different communities." However, she believes a
national standard is necessary for regulation on the Internet be-
cause of the nature of the medium, otherwise too much material
would be barred." The Justice argued that the Court has never
before forbade a national standard to evaluate material and that
the option should now be considered because of the unique charac-
ter of the Internet." Justice O'Connor concurred with the judg-
ment but wants the Court to adopt a national standard for decid-
ing if material is harmful to minors.5'
Justice Breyer concurred in judgment, but wrote separately to
advise of his desire that the word "community" be taken as "the
Nation's adult community taken as a whole, not to geographically
separate local areas" and believes that Congress intended for it to
be taken as such.52 He believes that to do otherwise would subject
web publishers to the most "puritan" of standards and to allow the
most restrictive communities to have veto power over displayed
material." Justice Breyer states that the differences in commu-
nity standards as applied by different local juries do not violate
the First Amendment.
Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, concurred in judgment
and wrote separately, exploring the different questions that arise
with a medium such as the Internet.5 Because of the nature of
web pages, more consideration is necessary to decide to evaluate
45. Id. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
46. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1713.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1714 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1715 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1715 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 1716 (Breyer, J., concurring).
54. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 1717.
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them on each individual page as a whole, or to consider inter-
linking pages as one."6 Because of this and the other problems
discussed by the district court, Justice Kennedy wrote that the
combination with the community standards might make the Act
unenforceable.57 The Justice fears that because it is so inexpen-
sive and easy to post on the web, and anyone can access it, COPA
makes the person that wonders onto a particular site the judge
and authority of the web.58
Justice Kennedy does not agree with Justice Breyer's proposi-
tion of the "national adult community", and does not believe it re-
flects what Congress meant by the statutory word "community".59
Because of the inevitable differing community standards, the Jus-
tice wrote that there is a burden on free speech, but this alone
does not make the Act void or enjoinable without examination of
the extent of speech covered. ° Justice Kennedy urged an exami-
nation of whom and what will be covered by the "commercial"
stipulation of the Act and how inter-connecting web pages will be
evaluated.6' Although he concurred in judgment, he stated it is
necessary for the court of appeals to fully analyze the case in the
first instance.2
Justice Stevens wrote in his dissenting opinion that because the
web publisher cannot control where his materials reach it is ex-
cessively restrictive to confine him to the community standards
that any particular community holds.63 Although COPA is much
narrower than CDA, Justice Stevens does not believe it is suffi-
ciently narrow for the medium and will not only protect children
but also restrict adults from significant amounts of material.64
The Justice fears that standards will be determined by the least
tolerant community and, therefore, what is available for viewing
will be that which is suitable to that community.6'
Justice Stevens criticized the petitioner's reliance on the deci-
sion in Ginsberg, noting that that decision involved the selling of
offensive materials to minors, not merely the possibility that they
56. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1717 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 1719 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 1720 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1725 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1726 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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may access the materials.66 Because of the nature of the medium,
the Internet, there is no way to control where the information is
displayed or to limit particular persons' or communities' access to
it.67 Stevens dislikes the comparisons to Sable and Hamling also
because of the ease of tailoring messages when sending traditional
mail and the obvious problems created by difficulty in directing e-
mail and messages sent over the World Wide Web.68 The Justice
fears that using community standards will unfairly burden
speech:
There is no reason to think the differences between communi-
ties' standards will disappear once the image or description is
no longer within the context of a work that has serious value
for minors. Because communities differ widely in their atti-
tudes toward sex, particularly when minors are concerned,
the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude that, regardless
of how COPA's other provisions are construed, applying com-
munity standards to the Internet will restrict a substantial
amount of protected speech that would not be considered
harmful to minors in many communities.69
If the least tolerant community standard determines what is
permissible to display Justice Stevens believes that legitimate and
valuable material will be kept from the segments of the population
that do not find them to be offensive.7" The Justice closed his dis-
sent with this prediction: "As a result, in the context of the Inter-
net this shield also becomes a sword, because the community that
wishes to live without certain material not only rids itself, but the
entire Internet of the offending speech." 71
Free speech is protected by the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, but that protection is not absolute,
and does not include obscene communications.72 In Roth v. United
66. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Ginsberg the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of the defendant for the violation of a New York statute prohib-
iting the sale to minors of material harmful to them because it was not unconstitutional.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 1274.
67. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1724 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1727 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1728 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth involved two
businessmen that mailed sexually explicit catalogs and circulars and were charged and
convicted with violating the federal obscenity statute. Id. at 480-82. The businessmen both
Winter 2003
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States73 the Court found that any speech or idea that has some
value to society is protected, but that those "utterly without re-
deeming social importance" are subject to the obscenity laws im-
posed by the state or government.74 Because the preservation of
free speech is essential to the United States, the Court realized
that the judging of obscene speech must be carefully tailored so as
not to violate the important right guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.75 Obscene material was deemed to be "material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest", as deter-
mined by applying community standards." The majority found
that defining obscenity does not violate the First Amendment and
that it is not protected speech.77
In 1964, Roth was upheld in Jacobellis v. Ohio"7, a case that re-
iterated the use of "contemporary community standards" to de-
termine if a movie could be considered obscene.79 Several years
later the Supreme Court found that a book could have literary
value that would prevail over its prurient interest.0 The Court
decided that because a book was not "utterly without redeeming
social value", as in Roth, it is not obscene even if it does appeal to
the prurient interest and is offensive according to community
standards.81 That same year the court upheld the convictions of
an individual and his three corporations, deciding that although
the material itself was not patently obscene, the manner in which
they sold and emphasized the sexuality was sufficient to convict.82
Despite the formulation in Roth and the following cases, the
court was not able to formulate a clear and definite test to apply to
contended that obscene speech was covered by the protection offered by the First Amend-
ment. Id at 478-79. See also Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); United States v. Rei-
del, 402 U.S. 354 (1971) (obscene material is not protected speech).
73. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 488.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 493-94.
78. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
79. Id. at 185.
80. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" Et Al. v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The book written by John Cleland, Mem-
oir's of a Woman of Pleasure, describing the life of a prostitute was written in 1750. Id. at
415.
81. Id. at 419-20.
82. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Although the materials were not
obscene, they were sold with an emphasis on the sexuality of the content, or pandering. Id.
at 466. The mailers even asked for mailing privileges from Blueball and Intercourse Penn-
sylvania in an effort to exploit the sexual nature of the towns' names. Id. at 467-68.
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the cases. As a result, each case was decided on a subjective ba-
sis.8" Because of the problems caused by this dilemma, the Su-
preme Court articulated a three-part test for determining if and
how material was to be considered obscene in Miller v. Califor-
nia." First the jury must decide "whether 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."85 Second,
the jury must consider "whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law", and third "whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."86 By applying this test, subject matter that may contain
sexual or vulgar substance must also have some educational, ar-
tistic, or literary value or it will be deemed obscene.87 In Miller
the Court attempted to provide functional and practical guidance
to state and federal courts, as well as to those that might find
themselves charged according to stipulations defined by the deci-
sion, and to discard the Court's past untailored custom of deci-
sions on a case-by-case basis.88
The Court emphasized the necessity to carefully examine works
so that no educational, scientific or politically relevant material
could be found obscene, because of such material's value to the
nation, whether controversial or not.88 Because of differing views
previously expressed by the Court, before a standard was deter-
mined, there was no objective standard and free speech was not
rightfully protected. ° When the Court decided Redrup v. New
York"' in 1967 the majority chose to reverse three separate convic-
tions on an obscenity issue that was not raised in the parties'
83. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
84. Id. In Miller the appellant was convicted of mailing obscene "adult" materials in
violation of a California obscenity statute. Id. at 18. The definition of obscenity used was:
'Obscene' means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially be-
yond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and
is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
CAL. PENAL CODE §311a (1969). The trial court told the jury to apply "contemporary com-
munity standards". Id. at 19-20.
85. Id. (as decided in Kois, 408 U.S. at 230).
86. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting from Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
87. Miller, 413 U.S. at 26.
88. Id. at 29.
89. Id. at 23.
90. Id.
91. 386 U.S. 767, 772 (1967).
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briefs rather than deal with those issues that brought the cases to
the Court.92 The dissent in Redrup, authored by Justice Harlan,
criticized the Court's refusal to deal with the issues presented and
its summary analysis of the obscenity of the materials in ques-
tion.9" Justice Harlan feared that the majority's decision in Re-
drup, due to the lack of definable standards, made the Court an
"unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively
judging each piece of material brought before us."
94
In Miller the majority eschewed a "national standard" despite
the inevitable variance from community to community. 95 Because
the United States is a large and diverse country, the majority rec-
ognized and accepted that there will be inconsistencies in juries
across the U.S., but also realized the impossibility of imposing a
uniform national community standard to which everyone must
conform.96 The Court found no requirement in the First Amend-
ment that a national standard be adhered to and found it unreal-
istic to impose the standards of one community on another. 97 Jus-
tice Burger stated that the effect is not to be determined by an
especially sensitive or especially tolerant person, but by the aver-
age person of average tolerance in the contemporary community. 9
One year later, in Hamling v. United States99 , the Supreme
Court reiterated the use of community standards and wrote that
the lack of some national standard does not make a statute uncon-
stitutional.10° The majority again emphasized that material is not
to be judged by the least sensitive or most sensitive person, or to
any one particular person, but by the average person in a commu-
nity.1 ' The jurors can take their own personal knowledge from
the community and apply it to their determination. The applica-
tion of the standards of a predetermined geographical area is not
92. Id. Redrup involved three separate acts in three different states of retailers selling
pornographic magazines or books in violation of state criminal laws. Id at 768-69. All
three cases were brought to the Supreme Court for reasons other than deciding if the mate-
rials should be determined obscene. Obscenity was not argued in the petitioner's or the
respondent's brief. Id. at 771-72.
93. Id. at 772.
94. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (quoting from Walker v. Ohio, 398 U. S. 434 (1970)).
95. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id. at 33-34.
99. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106.
100. In Hamling, the petitioners were convicted of mailing sexual material in violation
of a federal statute. Id. at 107.
101. Id. at 107.
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necessary for a statute to be constitutional. 2 The same year in
Jenkins v. Georgia"' the Court said that a state can stipulate a
precise geographic area if it chooses, or merely rely on the "con-
temporary community standards" description without specifying
the exact community.
0 4
Fifteen years later in Sable Communications Inc., of California
v. F.C.C"°', the Court stated that the Miller standard is not uncon-
stitutional when used in federal statutes, even if the communica-
tions in question reach numerous communities with varying stan-
dards. O6 Furthermore, the majority stated that it was not uncon-
stitutional to place the duty of compliance with varying commu-
nity standards on the messenger, including all costs and consid-
erations."7 No matter the medium, Sable requires the sender to
tailor its communication to the differing audiences and to bear the
responsibility of complying with each of its audiences' community
standards as applied to obscenity."' Because of this, messages
could be barred because they were obscene in one community even
if not in another.9
In 1996, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) was passed by
Congress to protect minors under the age of 18 from receiving in-
decent or obscene messages via the World Wide Web."' The Court
was asked to examine the constitutionality of CDA in Reno v.
ACLU"' and found it to be unconstitutional for several reasons."2
First, CDA was vague and did not clearly decipher between what
is obscene and what is not. It, therefore, had a stifling effect on
102. Id. at 104-05.
103. 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
104. Jenkins was convicted of distributing obscene materials in violation of a Georgia
Obscenity statute for showing the film "Carnal Knowledge" in a Georgia theatre. Id. at
154.
105. Sable, 492 U.S. at 25.
106. Sable Communications was a California based company that offered pre-recorded
sexual messages and had asked for injunctive relief from a federal statute. Id at 117-18.
The statute opposed by Sable, 49 U.S.C. §223 (Obscene or harassing phone calls), was over-
turned because it was unconstitutional due to not being narrowly defined enough to serve
the government's purpose. Id. at 131.
107. Id. at 125-26.
108. Id. at 126.
109. Id. at 125-26.
110. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844. Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C.S § 223 (repealed
1997).
111. Id. at 845.
112. Because of the ease of accessing material on the World Wide Web, for both adults
and children, the legislature was attempting to protect children from sexually explicit mat-
ter. Id. at 845-55.
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free speech."' Secondly, it included speech that is not obscene but
only indecent and protected by the First Amendment."4 And fi-
nally, the statute was too narrow."' Due to its content-based
regulations it controlled what was said, not how, and it was de-
cided to be overly broad."' The majority opinion, delivered by Jus-
tice Stevens, declared the statute overbroad and unconstitutional
because of its violation of the First Amendment."7  The United
States Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) in
response to the Court's decision in Reno."'
COPA was limited in several ways in comparison to CDA."9
COPA does not include e-mail, it limits its purview to commercial
purposes, and only applies to material that is harmful to minors,
rather than just "patently offensive".' COPA then uses the three-
part test developed in Miller to define what is harmful to mi-
nors."' Despite its differentiation from CDA, the Child Online
Protection Act was challenged immediately by free speech advo-
cates and injunctive relief was sought.2 '
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno23 the district court
found the statute to be unconstitutional. 4 The district court de-
cided that because COPA would include web sites that had some
content, and not necessarily all its content, devoted to material
that could be found harmful to minors it was not sufficiently lim-
ited.2  COPA's requirement of an age verification system would
discourage publishers from posting some material, while prevent-
ing others entirely from posting material due to economic reasons,
therefore imposing an unacceptable burden on speech. 26 Because
the statute was overbroad and not the least restrictive manner of
achieving the desired result, the district court found that COPA
113. Id. at 871.
114. Id. at 875.
115. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875..
116. Id. at 876-77. The Court stated, "The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly un-
precedented." Id. at 877.
117. Id. at 885.




122. Id. at 1706.
123. American Civil Liberties Union, 31 F. Supp. 2d. at 479-481
124. Id. See supra note 13.
125. Id. at 480.
126. Id. at 495.
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did violate the First Amendment.'27 The Court believed that
COPA would not survive further scrutiny."8
The government appealed the district court's ruling and the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the preliminary
injunction because the court believed COPA would be found to be
unconstitutional when adjudicated on its merits.' The opinion
written by Judge Garth finds fault with COPA's use of "commu-
nity standards" to determine what constitutes violative material
because of the nature of the World Wide Web. 3 ' Because of the
lack of geographic boundaries of the Web, the court believed that
"community standards" is not an adequate remedy and fear it will
force every web publisher to abide by the strictest community's
view."' Judge Garth wrote that the use of Miller's "community
standards" is inappropriate for the Web because the Web is dis-
tinguished from all other forms of communication due to its vast
reach.'32 Because there is no uniform community standard and the
Web reaches so many different places, the court decided that
COPA's reliance on Miller's "contemporary community standards"
was unrealistic and unconstitutional for the medium it gov-
erned.' In addition, because there could be irreparable harm
caused by the enforcement of COPA, as well as significant injury
outweighing any harm to the movant and benefit to the public in-
terest, the district court affirmed the sought injunction, prevent-
ing the statute from being enforced.' The Supreme Court of the
United States of America then granted certiorari to review the
issue of "community standards" under the Child Online Protection
Act.
135
The proliferation and importance of the World Wide Web has
created numerous issues with which we have only just begun to
deal. Because the medium has such a unique nature that has
never before been considered, the conflicts that have yet to arise
are numerous. The Internet offers an extremely cheap and light-
ening fast alternative to traditional methods of advertising, educa-
tion, research and media. With very little training or knowledge
127. Id. at 498.
128. American Civil Liberties Union, 217 F.2d.at 492-93.
129. Id. at 166.
130. Id. at 174.
131. Id. at 175.
132. Id. at 176-77.
133. American Civil Liberties Union, 217 F.2d. at 177-78.
134. Id. at 180.
135. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1707.
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anyone can start their own website and feasibly put anything they
choose on the Web, and it will be just a simple click away from
millions of eyes. As the Internet is available to the majority of the
population, either at home, school or work, the interest of children
surfing the web is an obvious concern to parents and legislators
alike.'36 Congress approached the obvious problem with the en-
actment of CDA and then with COPA.18
The use of community standards to determine what is obscene,
and therefore, unprotected speech is especially confounding when
applied to the Internet because of its incredibly wide reach. 8
Since the Web can reach just about any community, town, village
or hamlet throughout the world it is unbelievably daunting to
imagine the many different "standards" through which it will be
viewed. There is conceivably the most restrictive to the most free-
spirited of values, by which material can be judged. Since of the
importance of speech not being restricted the use of one commu-
nity's standards to determine what should be readily available
and not available is too restraining of a guideline. Because one
community's determination can deem something "harmful to mi-
nors", speech that is not obscene, but merely questionable, can be
placed behind a protective screen and banned from easily attain-
able viewing.
Although the argument can be made that COPA does not com-
pletely remove any potentially harmful websites, but rather puts
them behind a screen that can be pierced with proper age verifica-
tion, it is still a restrictive method that will limit ability to access
materials and speech. People without credit cards, or those wary
of using their card due to identity theft, credit card misuse, or
identification, will be unfairly burdened or prevented from access-
ing possible relevant educational and informational tools. By plac-
ing a screen over any material that is judged by varying commu-
nity standards to be harmful there will be material that is per-
fectly acceptable in some communities reserved from their ease of
viewing due to another communities' intolerance. The burden
placed on any publisher to abide by any community that may hap-
pen upon their web material is unrealistic and excessive. It ham-
pers the flow of speech in a forum, the World Wide Web, where it
is not only important, but necessary.
136. Id. at 1704.
137. Id. at 1704-05.
138. Id. at 1724-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor urges that the community standard be a "na-
tional community standard.""9 Justice Breyer encourages a simi-
lar "Nation's Adult community as a whole." °40 A "national stan-
dard" or an "adult standard" creates no more easily discernable
solution than the statute's "community standards" and are only
facially deceptive differences. The "national standard" or "adult
standard" will still differ depending on who is called upon to sup-
ply this standard. Ten different people, all with different views of
the United States, will invoke ten different standards to attribute
to the nation as a whole. It is ridiculous to think people will not
bring with them their geographically imposed values, prejudices
and morals when determining that which they believe to be offen-
sive. By using any sort of standard to judge a medium with no
discernable geographic boundaries, there will always be an unfair
burden on the publisher to comply with the myriad of different
communities their material may potentially enter. Until there is
some mechanism to geographically limit the entrance of material
into certain areas of cyberspace there should not be a geographi-
cally controlling "community standard" under which the material
may be judged. There is commercially available filtering software
that can prevent some questionable material from being viewed.
That is the only feasible solution available at this point.
Obviously, the smallest community every American belongs to is
their household or family community. It is this community that in
the end should be the deciding force on what is viewed within its
borders. Although there is a substantial amount of material on
the World Wide Web that could be viewed as "harmful to minors"
there is also a vast amount of material that is educational and
informative for all ages and groups. It is the members of the
household that one lives in whom ultimately decide the standards
on what is, and what is not, acceptable for viewing. The task of
deciding what each minor should be able to peruse and what
139. Id. at 1714-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
140. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. at 1715-16 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy (with Jus-
tices Souter and Ginsburg concurring) criticized Justice Breyer's and Justice O'Connor's
implication that the legislative intent was not a geographic community, but a "national" or
'adult" community. Id. at 1719 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
There is one statement in a House Committee Report to this effect, "reflecting," Jus-
tice Breyer writes, "what apparently was a uniform view within Congress." The
statement, perhaps, reflects the view of a majority of one House committee, but there
is no reason to believe that it reflects the view of a majority of the House of Represen-
tatives, let alone the "uniform view within Congress."
Id. at 1719 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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would be "harmful" is the job of that minor's guardians, educators
and care-providers. The duty of protecting minors from harmful
material should be placed with these people, not with the Web
publishers. To do otherwise restricts speech and everyone's ability
to access it. The job of taking care of the children should always
reside in those that know and care for them, not a nameless, face-
less group deciding an artificial standard that will subject the en-
tire nation to their attitudes and values.
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